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THE GLOBAL DIMENSION OF THE EU’S AFSJ: ON INTERNAL 
TRANSPARENCY AND EXTERNAL PRACTICE 
Elaine Fahey* 
 
ABSTRACT 
The ‘global’ forms an increasingly regular, active and explicit part of the daily business of 
the EU.  The paper argues that there is a specific mismatch between the commitment to 
transparency on a daily level in international and external fields and practices of EU law 
and the actual substantive law-making practice evolving. While the EU’s vision of the 
global is to a degree the most transparent ever, the converse is not necessarily the case as 
to its legal content. The global dimension to EU law has increasingly expansive subjects 
and objectives, in areas of existing strength in global actorness (e.g. trade) and in more 
evolving competences (e.g. security). It argues that while the EU is a significant soft power 
in trade, it is arguably less so in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ) where 
its global reach becomes more challenging. The relative weakness of the EU’s global 
approach in the AFSJ is usually or acutely felt by individuals who face challenges in 
seeking redress increasingly as to aspects of transparency. The paper argues that there is 
a significant mismatch of internal transparency practices concerning the EU’s global law-
making. Ultimately, mismatches between internal procedures and external law-making 
as to transparency operate adversely upon the global in a variety of ways, e.g. as to 
transparency and clarity, good administration and territoriality claims taken by 
individuals. It outlines the express approach to the global in EU policy in (i) migration (ii) 
passenger name records and the non-express approach to the ‘global’ in EU data 
protection and data transfers.  
 
 
 
_______ 
*Elaine Fahey, Institute for the Study of European Law (ISEL), City Law School, City, University of 
London. Email: elaine.fahey.1@city.ac.uk  
 
 INTRODUCTION 
 
Internal law-making within the European Union (EU) is now conducted with one of the 
highest possible levels of transparency and openness of legislative procedures in contrast 
with many international organisations.1 Externally, the EU’s international relations are 
increasingly conducted with higher levels of transparency, openness and participation, 
making a sharp break with conventional international practices. Yet, significant 
transparency law exceptions remain as to EU international affairs which arguably reflect 
a tension and mismatch at the heart thereof. As a significant global soft power, the EU 
increasingly has global reach and effects through its laws, predominantly in trade. In 
fields at the outskirts of trade such as migration, aviation security or the internet, the EU 
increasingly engages more directly with challenging aspects of globalisation and global 
governance. In such domains, the EU is arguably less of a soft power globally in non-trade 
issues, where its voice and actions are embryonic. There, its global reach, effects and 
significance are often more complex and multifarious in how it manifests itself.  
 
This paper argues that there is a significant mismatch of transparency in internal law-
making and external practice which increasingly obscures its distinctive ‘globalness’. This 
is arguably especially so where the EU is a more reticent or weaker global actor or simply 
acts in a more complex domain. The Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ) 
exemplifies the challenges of the EU as a global actor battling the most complex 
contemporary elements of globalisation or global governance regimes, beyond areas of 
EU global strength, for example, in trade.  Here, EU global action impacts significantly 
upon the individual, perhaps even more distinctively than trade. It is a more complex area 
of the EU to adopt a ‘global’ approach because of its multifarious subjects and objects. It 
is also an area significant causal or consequential effects can result for the individual 
where there are transparency and openness shortcomings and a lack of clarity as to the 
meaning of the EU’s global approach. The AFSJ thus forms a useful emerging study where 
the subjects and objects of its global remit increasingly seek remedies. The remedies 
                                                 
1 See A. Alemanno, ‘Unpacking the Principle of Openness in EU Law: Transparency, Participation and 
Democracy’ (2014) 39(1) E L Review 72; P. Leino, ‘The Principle of Transparency in EU External Relations’ 
in M. Cremona (ed.) Structural Principles of EU External Relations (Hart 2018), 201. 
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sought relate more often to foundational elements of transparency, particularly clarity 
and access. The complexity of the global regimes addressed by the EU in this domain are 
self-evident. The capacity of individuals to challenge the clarity dimension of 
transparency therein will likely rise and so the AFSJ provides for a compelling example. 
The mismatch between internal practices and external action is here magnified where the 
global dimension thereof renders their scrutiny increasingly problematic and difficult for 
an individual. It aggravates the incoherence in the internal and external uses of the term 
‘global’ despite its rising banal incidence as regular business of the EU. It also raises the 
question as to the clarity of knowledge and expression about the global on a daily basis in 
the EU. There are important information trade-offs involved in law-making with global 
effects which the EU has sought to radically transcend.2 This increasingly has 
implications for the distinctiveness of the EU’s boundless vision of the global as well as 
its proliferation of subjects and objects.  
 
The paper deploys three case studies of the EU’s AFSJ, its most sensitive and burgeoning 
area of law-making, with significant internal and external intersections in most of its law 
and policy. It considers migration, passenger name records (PNR) and data transfers and 
their ‘global’ component, with transparency and openness issues arising in three areas.  
 
Section I examines the distinctiveness of the ‘global’ in EU policy and law; Section II 
considers international relations as an exception in EU transparency law; Section III 
assesses the express approach to the global in EU policy in (i) migration (ii) passenger 
name records; the non-express global approach to data protection, followed by Analysis 
and Reflections.  
 
I. THE EU’S VISION OF THE GLOBAL  
(i) The ‘Global’ in Policy 
                                                 
2 See famously, M. Shapiro, ‘Administrative Law Unbounded: Reflections on Government and Governance’ 
(2001) 8 (2) Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 369. 
 The EU is explicitly committed in its treaties to being a distinctive ‘globalist’ as a matter 
of law and to pursuing multilateral solutions.3 Significant entities in the world currently 
wish to leave or threaten to leave or defund several international organisations (e.g. 
African Union from the International Criminal Court (ICC), UK from the Council of 
Europe and EU, US from the WTO, NATO or UN, amongst others).4 The EU, by contrast, 
has and continues to support the development of both existing and new international 
organisations through institutionalisation. For example, the EU has a recent history of 
promoting and ‘nudging’ institutional multilateral innovations in a range of trade and 
security fields, from the International Criminal Court,5 a UN Ombudsman6 to a 
Multilateral Investment Court,7 promoting a distinctive global vision accountability, 
legitimacy and the rule of law.  
 
The EU’s vision of the ‘global’ in its policies is also ostensibly distinctive. Many leading 
EU policy documents across a range of policies have an explicitly global dimension and 
span ranges of EU international relations, in the pre- and post-Lisbon period: e.g. 
European Security Strategy,8 European Agenda on Security,9 Action Plan on Human 
Rights and Democracy,10 Trade and Investment Strategy-the Trade for All Strategy11 or 
the Joint Framework on countering hybrid threats.12 The EU’s Global Strategy for EU 
Foreign and Security Policy launched in 2016 is the most explicit invocation of the term 
‘global’ in the EU’s policy making to date.13 The EU’s vision of the global has been argued 
                                                 
3 Cf. Article 21 TFEU. 
4 J. Ikenberry, ‘The end of liberal international order?’ (2018) 94(1) International Affairs 7; K. Smith, ‘The 
European Union in an illiberal world’ (2017) 116 Current History 83. 
5 See: International Criminal Court: see The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (1998). 
6 See: UN Ombudsman: See UNSC Resolution 2083 (2012). 
7 See: Multilateral Investment Court: See Council of the European Union, ‘Negotiating directives for a 
Convention establishing a multilateral court for the settlement of investment disputes’ 12981/17. 
8 A secure Europe in a better world - European security strategy. (European Commission, Brussels, 
12 December 2003). 
9 See Commission, ‘Communication from the Commission: The European Agenda on Security’ COM (2015) 
185 final. 
10  Council, ‘Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy 2015 -2019 as adopted by the Council on 20 July 
2015’; Council Conclusions 10897/15 Brussels, 20 July 2015. 
11 See ‘Trade for All: Towards a More Responsible Trade and Investment Policy’ (European Commission, 14 
October 2015) <http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/in-focus/new-trade-strategy/> accessed 11 November 
2018.  
12 See ‘Joint Framework on Countering Hybrid Threats: A European Union Response’ JOIN (2016) 18 final. 
13 The growing prominent of foreign policy is evident within EU law from the new Strategy, which is 60 
pages long and reflects the enhanced foreign affairs competences of the EU post-Lisbon, multiples of its 
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to be one of the most transparent and open or participatory EU strategies ever produced 
because it was constructed or conceived through a process of input from a range of EU 
think-tanks and 50 gatherings in the EU and beyond.14 It is a significant change in action 
given that EU foreign policies have generally been conceived within an iterative process 
between the EU, national and international legal orders- and is also distinctive 
internationally.15  
The EU’s vision of the global is understood to tread a difficult line between ‘realist’ and 
‘normative’ approaches to foreign policy, hovering between shared and common action 
with European values, albeit. The EU’s vision of a rules-based global order therein with 
multilateralism as its key principle contrasts sharply with emergent administrations.16  
However, since parts of the Strategy appear to have lost their salience since its 
publication, either expressly or by implication through short-term views of the global, its 
attempt to fashion itself as an overarching vision is perhaps disputable.17 As a result, the 
EU’s vision of the global can be argued to promote certain ambiguity as to the question as 
to the essence of the EU’s global, despite its highly distinctive character.18 Transparency 
and openness aside, this multi-faceted distinctiveness is arguably reflected in the global 
dimension of EU law.  
  
(ii) The ‘Global’ in EU law 
As is evidenced through the EU’s global attempts to develop its strategy through openness 
and widespread participation, the ‘global’ features appears to be an increasingly prolific 
part of the daily business of the EU across fields. An ‘advanced’ search of the Eur-lex 
database for ‘global’ in the text in the official journal (in force) reveals across all fields 
over 7000 documents, out of approximately 19,000 EU legislative acts currently in force, 
                                                 
predecessors in length. See G. Grevi, ‘A Global Strategy for a Soul-searching European Union’ (2016) 
European Policy Centre 1.  
14 i.e. in Turkey, Tunisia, Norway, Japan and Australia and gatherings of the Foreign Affairs Council 
Development Council, Defence, COREPER, Secretary divisions and Departments of Foreign Affairs. 
15 See M. Cremona, ‘Values in EU Foreign Policy’ in M. Evans and P. Koutrakos (eds), Beyond the 
Established Legal Order: Policy Interconnections between the EU and the Rest of the World (Hart 2011). 
16 See Ikenberry ; Smith above (n 4); See Strategy 3.5. 
17 It was published 48 hours after the Brexit vote in June 2016, to convey ‘business as usual’. See ‘Editorial 
comments, We Perfectly Know What to Work For: The EU’s Global Strategy for Foreign and Security Policy’ 
(2016) 53 CMLR 1199. For example, its omission of Brexit or its inclusion of the now seemingly ill-fated 
TTIP. 
18 Editorial, ibid, 1203. 
 including directives, regulations, decisions and external agreements as well as other 
instruments e.g. resolutions, reports, guidelines, declarations, programmes, opinions, 
communications, conclusions and statutes, a reasonable fraction of its ongoing work.19  
 
On a purely descriptive analysis, the ‘global’ is not an explicit part of the EU treaties as a 
regularised legal concept. Instead, the treaties reference a vast array of terms as to entities 
other than Member States in the treaties, e.g. citizens, third parties, interests, third 
countries but do not employ the generic term of global objects, or anything specific about 
‘others’. The Member States of the EU are empirically and explicitly the primary ‘subjects’ 
of the EU treaties, receiving more references than any other entity in the treaties.20 While 
the CJEU in its landmark caselaw has dramatically re-interpreted subjects and objects in 
EU law to include citizens, beyond this there is less guidance.21 It raises the question as to 
the clarity of the direction of the EU as to ‘others’.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
19 An ‘advanced’ search in the Eur-lex database for ‘global’ in all secondary legislation in force from 
1/12/2009 to 1/11/2018 reveals 17705 documents. Where ‘global’ is delimited to the text in the official 
journal, the number is 7552. The time delimitation used here is from the Treaty of Lisbon to the present 
day, roughly 2 legislative cycles, so as to provide for a reasonable snapshot. The ‘All documents’ search 
range shows inter alia from regulations to budget, directives, recommendations, opinions, Guidance, 
Communications, Financial Regulation, Communications and Statutes, predominantly Decisions, 
predominantly in Competition Policy, then External relations. A search of the curia.eu database 
‘searchform’ from 01/12/2009 to 1/11/2018 for the term ‘global’ in the text of closed cases reveals 609 hits 
in areas spanning almost every field of EU law. On the amount of EU law currently in force as part of the 
acquis: see House of Commons Library 4 April 2017 Briefing papers 7867, 7863, 7850 ‘Legislating for Brexit’ 
series and Financial Times, ‘New EU Laws make UK’s complex Brexit ever more difficult’ (21 June 2017). 
20 See the calculation as follows using Eur-lex and Curia databases (at the time of writing): See S. Bardutzky 
and E. Fahey (eds), Framing the Subjects and Objects of EU law (Edward Elgar 2017) ch 1, Table 1. 
21 I.e. Case 26/62 NV Algemene Transport- en Expeditie Onderneming van Gend & Loos v Netherlands 
Inland Revenue Administration, ECLI:EU:C:1963:1. 
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Table I:  
References to entities in the EU Treaties: Source: S. Bardutzky and E. Fahey (eds), 
Framing the Subjects and Objects of EU Law (Edward Elgar 2017) ch. 1, Table 1. 
 
Entity referenced  TEU TFEU 
‘Citizens’ 14 5 
‘Contracting parties’ 1 1 
‘Member states’ 99 400 
‘Subjects of the treaties’ 0 0 
‘Subject of the treaties’ 0 0 
‘Subjects of the agreements’ 0 1 
‘Subject of an agreement’ 1 1 
‘Third Parties’ 1 6 
‘Third Persons’ 0 0 
‘Third countries’ 5 45 
‘Interests’ 13 21 
 
The EU’s soft power as a global trade actor is self-evident. 22 The legal dimension of this 
soft power and its impact is viewed as a rising phenomenon.23 Third countries, parties 
and actors are affected by the global reach of EU law.24 From EU animal welfare law, 
                                                 
22 E.g. A. Young, ‘The European Union as a Global Regulator? Context and comparison’ (2015) 22(9) 
Journal of European Public Policy 1233; C. Damro ‘Market Power Europe’ (2012) 19(5) Journal of European 
Public Policy 682. 
23 see A. Bradford, ‘The Brussels Effect’ (2012) 107 Northwestern University Law Review 1. 
24 See generally P. Lamy, What Future for the EU in the Global Trading System (Intereconomics 2016); 
See A. Young and J. Peterson, Parochial Global Europe: 21st Century Trade Politics (OUP 2014); See A. 
 financial and banking legislation, EU Competition law, EU Environmental law to data 
protection, there is an asserted rise in the adoption of EU law beyond its borders, known 
as ‘The Brussels Effects’.25 There is also a perceived rise in ‘EU extra-territoriality,’ in a 
variety of forms.26 The reach of EU law is not merely unidirectional from an economic 
perspective but also administrative and procedural, spanning rights and obligations for 
the EU and its subjects and objects as others. For example, EU Administrative decisions 
are increasingly addressed to individuals or legal persons in third countries and sanctions 
regimes both widen and deepen.27 The global dimension of EU law also results in more 
international trade agreements post-Lisbon containing regulatory cooperation with 
quasi-legislative effects in a variety of fields and a range of third party participation 
rights.28 It raises the question as to the clarity of the global dimension of EU law and how 
we know and understand its expression. Here, the global dimension of EU law as ‘reach’ 
is not exclusively but heavily centered upon trade, which this account returns to.  
 
SECTION II: THE CRUMBLING EXCEPTION: INTERNATIONAL 
RELATIONS IN EU TRANSPARENCY LAW 
While the EU’s vision of the global is the most transparency ever, the converse is not 
necessarily the case as to its legal content. The global dimension to EU law continues to 
expand with increasingly expansive subjects and objectives. However, its explicit meaning 
and expression varies considerably. The conduct of the global dimension to EU law and 
knowledge of its actions are governed by a variety of law and governance, principally 
relating to transparency and openness. Transparency and openness are at the heart of the 
                                                 
Young, ‘Liberalising Trade, Not Exporting Rules: The Limits to Regulatory Co-ordination in the EU’s “New 
Generation” Preferential Trade Agreements’ (2015) (22) (9) Journal of European Public Policy 1253. 
25 See J. Scott, ‘From Brussels with Love: The Transatlantic Travels of European Law and the Chemistry of 
Regulatory Attraction’ (2009) 57 American Journal of Comparative Law 897; See S. Kingston, ‘Territoriality 
in EU (Taxation) Law: A Sacred Principle, or Dépassé?’ in J. Englisch (ed), International Tax Law and New 
Challenges from Constitutional and Legal Pluralism (IBFD 2015). 
26 See E. Fahey, The Global Reach of EU Law (Routledge 2016) ch 2. 
27 For example, Article 11(3) Treaty on the European Union (TEU) provides that the Commission is obliged 
to consult in its rule-making with ‘the parties concerned’, largely understood to encompass stakeholders 
irrespective of their country of origin. See E. Korkeo-aho, ‘Evolution of the Role of Third Countries in EU 
Law - Towards Full Legal Subjectivity?’ in S. Bardutzky & E. Fahey (eds) Framing the Subjects and Objects 
of EU Law: Exploring a Research Platform (Edward Elgar Publishing 2017) 227. 
28 E.g. W. Weiß ‘Delegation to treaty bodies in EU agreements: Constitutional constraints and proposals for 
strengthening the European Parliament’ (2018) 14(3) European Constitutional Law Review 532. 
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EU’s efforts to become a nascent transnational democracy, unlike public international 
law, where it is more embryonic.29 Transparency also has a weak conceptualisation in 
international relations (IR) theory, the core study of external power, where the disclosure, 
dialogue and information compete within schools of thought.   
 
A distinction exists in EU law and governance between transparency, bound up with 
clarity, publication and access, and openness, being understood as freedom of 
information and increased participation on the other hand.30 There are a plethora of 
primary and secondary legal bases for transparency and openness in EU law.31 
Transparency is a long-established feature of the law of the EU. It is about engendering 
trust in the processes which affect the citizen by enabling them to understand, and if 
necessary, challenge those processes.32 Article 1 of the Treaty on the European Union 
(TEU) requires decisions to be taken as openly a possible and Article 15 of the Treaty on 
the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), emphasises the need to guarantee 
openness in the context of procedures that lead to the adoption of a legislative act. Article 
42 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights (CFR) states that it is the right of any citizen of 
the Union, natural or legal person residing or having its registered office in a member 
state to have a right of access to documents of the institutions, bodies, and agencies of the 
Union whatever their medium. Articles 1 and 15 TFEU provides the legal basis for 
                                                 
29 A. Bianchi, ‘On Power and Illusion: The Concept of Transparency in International law’ in A. Bianchi and 
A. Peters (eds) Transparency in International Law (OUP 2013) 1. Transparency, however, has had a 
profoundly unpleasant history in the EU, sparked by the Danish vote against the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 
and the resignation of the Santer Commission in the aftermath of a report in 1999. Secrecy was perceived 
to be the root cause of many such problems of EU governance and a highly reactive law-making process 
has ensued since then.  See A. Von Bogdandy, ‘The European Lesson for International Democracy: The 
Significance of Article 9 to 12 EU Treaty for International Organizations’ (2012) 23(2) European Journal of 
International Law 315; See D. Curtin, ‘The Role of Judge-Made Law and EU Supranational Government: A 
Bumpy Road from Secrecy to Translucence’ in E. Spaventa et al (eds), Empowerment and 
Disempowerment of the EU Citizen (Hart 2012); See also D. Curtin, Executive Power of the European 
Union (OUP 2011); See J. Mendes, Participation in EU Rulemaking (OUP 2011). 
30 Transparency includes fundamentally an obligation to use clear language which supports action with 
reason, for reasons of visibility, explicability and predictability. See Alemanno (n 1); Mendes, ibid.  
31 See generally Leino (n 1). 
32 It is also an expression of the principle of fairness in relation to the processing of personal data expressed 
in Article 8 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. Under the GDPR (Article 5(1)(a)6 
), in addition to the requirements that data must be processed lawfully and fairly, transparency is now 
included as a fundamental aspect of these principles. 17/EN WP260 Guidelines on transparency under 
Regulation 2016/679 p.6. 
p. 5. 
 Regulation 1049/2001 on access to documents, the EU’s fundamental framework for 
transparency, policy and governance.33 Recent trade legislation (e.g. on trade defence), 
increasingly provides for transparency and openness practices.34 Article 4 (1) (a) of the 
Regulation provides for an important exception in EU law for international relations, 
holding that ‘the institutions shall refuse access to a document where disclosure would 
undermine the protection of…the public interest as regard… international relations.’ 
However, the EU’s international relations exception in transparency regulation appears 
more and more redundant. While the Council appears ‘to cling on’ to its contours,35 it has 
been gradually eroded by the CJEU, practices of the Ombudsman and EU institutions 
themselves in response to public criticism.36 As it stands, the exception does not enable 
formal consideration of public interest in openness and institutional proposals for reform 
of the exceptions have not been accepted.37 However, leading caselaw has acknowledged 
the significance of transparency and public interest warranting disclosure in several 
international negotiations context, not limited to trade but rather in many key AFSJ 
domains.38   
 
There are significant shifts by all EU institutions and major actors as to their conduct of 
the global towards openness, contrary to the actual state of the current law, and thus of 
significance, in a range of areas, from trade to security.39 The Council of Ministers has 
                                                 
33 Alongside a Treaty-based access to documents regime, the EU also has a regime for the protecting and 
handling of classified information, the latter lacking a clear constitutional basis. 
34 Regulation (EU) 2018/825 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2018 amending 
Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 on protection against dumped imports from countries not members of the 
European Union and Regulation (EU) 2016/1037 on protection against subsidised imports from countries 
not members of the European Union. 
35 It has recently adopted a policy of only declassifying on a case-by-case basis: Council conclusions on the 
negotiation and conclusion of EU trade agreements (8 May 2018) 8622/18. 
36 A. Bianchi, ‘On Power and Illusion: The Concept of Transparency in International’ in A. Bianchi and A. 
Peters (eds), Transparency in International Law (OUP 2013) 1. 
37 Leino, above (n 1), 221. 
38 T-529/09 In’t veld v. council ECLI:EU:T:2012:215; C-350/12P Council v.  In’t veld 
ECLI:EU:C:2014:2039; T-301/10 In’t veld v. commission (In’t veld II) ECLI:EU:T:2013:135; T- 331/11 
Besselink v. Council ECLI:EU:T:2013:419 
39 See P. Leino, ‘Transparency, Participation and EU Institutional Practice: An Inquiry into the Limits of 
the Widest Possible’ (2014) 3 EUI Working Papers 2-3, 25-26 < 
http://cadmus.eui.eu//handle/1814/30580> accessed 11 November 2018.  
39 P Leino, ‘On Knowledge as Power: The Transparency of EU Law-Making Procedures’ (EU Law Analysis; 
10 Jan 2016) <http://eulawanalysis.blogspot.co.uk/2016/01/on-knowledge-as-power-transparency-
of.html> accessed 11 November 2018; D. Curtin and A. Meijer, ‘Does Transparency Strengthen Legitimacy?’ 
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begun to declassify negotiation mandates for international trade agreements only after 
individual MEPs began to illegally leak negotiation texts as part of a wave of political and 
local opposition toward the secrecy of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership (TTIP) and EU-Canada Economic Partnership Agreement (CETA) 
negotiations in particular.40 The European Commission, along with a host of other actors 
(from the EP to the Ombudsman) but predominantly itself, has effectively put 
transparency as a lead constitutional ideal in all EU international trade negotiations, 
reacting to political rather than legal principles.41 The European Parliament has also 
increased its demands for transparency in EU international relations negotiations, year 
upon year post-Lisbon, using a broad methodology of inter-institutional agreements, 
litigation and soft power (e.g. non-binding resolutions) and has voted down agreements 
because of transparency issues thereafter.42 The EP notoriously voted down the ACTA 
copyright agreement because of a lack of information using its newfound powers in the 
area of IR after the Treaty of Lisbon.43 In a handful of cases largely taken by NGOs and 
individual MEPs and an academic, the Court of Justice has gradually eroded to a very 
considerable extent the exception surrounding international relations in its Access to 
Documents Regulation in litigation against the Council and Commission in security and 
trade.44 From security and data transfers to migration, the Ombudsman is increasingly 
putting international relations at heart of work despite being excluded in her role from 
the Access to Documents Regulation, e.g. as to EU-US Passenger Name Records (PNR) 
(i.e. security), EU-Turkey relations (i.e. migration) or EU-Australia PNR (security):- an 
                                                 
(2006) 11 Information Polity 109, 120; See M. Hilldebrandt, D. Curtin, and A. Meijer, ‘Transparency in the 
EU Council of Ministers: An Institutional Analysis’ (2014) 20(1) Eur LJ 1.  
40 See E. Fahey, ‘On the Benefits of the TTIP Negotiations for the EU Legal Order: A Legal Perspective’ 
(2016) 43(4) Legal Issues of Economic Integration 327. It has recently adopted a policy of only declassifying 
on a case-by-case basis: Council conclusions on the negotiation and conclusion of EU trade agreements (8 
May 2018) 8622/18. 
41 E.g. European Commission, Factsheet: Transparency in EU Trade negotiations (2013) 
<http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2013/june/tradoc_151381.pdf> accessed 11 November 2018. 
42 See Case C-350/12 P Council of the European Union v Sophie in ’t Veld ECLI:EU:C:2014:2039; See 
Vigjilenca Abazi & Martijn Hillebrandt, ‘The Legal Limits to Confidential Negotiations: Recent Case Law 
Developments in Council Transparency: Access Info Europe and in ‘t Veld’ (2015) 52 CML Rev 825; See 
Christoph Herrmann, ‘Transleakancy’ in C Herrmann, B Simma & R Streinz (eds), Trade Policy between 
Law, Diplomacy and Scholarship (European Yearbook of International Economic Law Series 39, Springer 
2015); Eugénia da Conceição-Heldt , Exploring the TTIP Transparency Paradox (forthcoming) . 
43 See D. Curtin, ‘Official Secrets and the Negotiation of International Agreements: Is the EU Executive 
Unbound?’ (2013) 50(2) CML Review 423.  
44 See the caselaw cited above (n 38). 
 extraordinary array of decisions on EU international relations, despite the EU IR 
exception surrounding her role.45   
 
This crumbling yet extant exception as to the intersection of the global with internal laws 
and processes here is of much significance because it increasingly renders the ‘global’ 
dimension of EU law mismatched with law and practice. Given the broader array of 
subjects and objects at stake, it draws much attention in particular to the ‘clarity’ 
dimension of transparency: is it ‘do what I do’, not ‘do what I say?’ It is also argued here 
to generate ambiguity as to the global and whilst also increasingly obscures its 
distinctiveness. Ultimately, mismatches between internal procedures and external law-
making as to transparency operate adversely upon the EU’s global in a variety of ways, 
but increasingly also as to individuals raising or generating significant transparency 
issues. In particular, the AFSJ is argued to show the challenges of the EU as a global actor 
battling the most complex contemporary elements of globalisation or global governance 
regimes. As a result, the account argues that the global dimension and approach of the 
AFSJ remains understudied. It is an area more liable to generate adverse individual 
effects through misleading or simply complex uses of the term global, brought about 
through assertions of EU global actorness where a lack of transparency does not facilitate 
scrutiny or remedies. The AFSJ benefits increasingly from shifts in practices more 
broadly. Yet it is a more complex area of the EU to adopt a global approach, where less 
transparency results in significant individual effects. The account thus explores the EU’s 
global approach to law-making in areas where it is arguably weaker as a global actor than 
in trade, often self-evidently so. 
 
The account next compiles express formulations of EU ‘Global’ approaches in law and 
policy, selecting internal and external areas of competence and policy, predominantly in 
the area of external relations and specifically in the EU’s AFSJ. 
 
                                                 
45 See above: Section II (as to PNR) and see Access to documents of the institutions and decision of the 
European Ombudsman of 6 January 2015 closing her own initiative inquiry O1/10/2014/RA concerning 
the European Commission on dealing with requests for information and access to documents 
(Transparency). 
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II. EXPRESS AND IMPLIED EU ‘GLOBAL’ APPROACHES IN AFSJ 
LAW-MAKING: MIGRATION, PNR & DATA   
 
One of the most sensitive and controversial aspects of the EU’s AFSJ is its creation of an 
ostensibly borderless space for freedom, security and justice, developing on from its 
internal market; thereby enabling deeper integration and a fuller realisation of rights and 
EU-wide justice. It has been institutionalised through shared competences, minimum 
standards legislation and the substantive institutionalisation of mutual recognition. The 
AFSJ as set out in Article 3(2) TEU as an ‘area’ and as expanded in Title V of the TFEU 
(Articles 67-89), arguably also represents one of the broadest, most controversial and 
perhaps complex policy fields of EU law and governance. In almost every iteration, it 
crosses national, regional, international law, with a vast array of sources, that increasingly 
overlap internal and external policies or fields. The AFSJ has no real objective or finality 
and has competing visions, rendering its global ambitions interesting to study. It is 
undoubtedly a more complex policy field for the EU to be a global actor in a variety of 
areas, yet which has not hindered its ambitions. It is a place where the EU’s 
multilateralism is somewhat weaker and more embryonic, given that many of its policy 
fields are some of the most complex aspects of global governance.46  
 
The account next uses three examples of the EU’s Area of Freedom, Security and Justice 
(AFSJ) traversing internal and external dimensions with significant border components- 
either expressly or impliedly being understood as global policy: migration, PNR and data. 
All have significant internal and external dimension and feature high profile clashes 
where EU law transgresses borders, physically or virtually, as to data, people and security  
and are argued to be revealing of objectives, means and projected outcomes as unsolved 
elements of globalisation. It is obvious and predictable that there would be differences as 
to competences to a degree between the examples. However, all examples selected 
traverse the AFSJ in law and policy and demonstrate the EU as a global actor fighting 
elements of globalisation (e.g. migration) or battling unsolved or emerging facets of global 
                                                 
46 Cf C. Costello, Destination Europe (OUP 2016) 17. 
 governance (e.g. data transfers or data surveillance). The account thus focuses upon the 
mismatch as to the internal practices and external law-making there, focussing upon the 
clarity dimension to transparency. It further considers how the mismatch generates 
ambiguity of the global and obscures its distinctiveness. Two examples are selected here 
of an extremely high-profile nature (migration) and an ongoing nature (PNR), while a 
third (data), is a cross-cutting subject field in a variety of ways. For the first two examples 
(migration and PNR), their unifying feature is the express use of the term ‘global’ in their 
nomenclature as policy instruments of EU law and while the third is understood to be a 
de facto and de jure global policy by implication. However, all three demonstrate an intent 
on the part of the EU to design a global reach or effect.  
The account examines (i) how EU law intersects with global in three key distinct areas of 
EU law and policy.  It critically examines (ii) why the bilateral approach here is termed a 
‘global’ approach and (iii) it examines how global approach interacts with transparency 
and openness issues, in particular clarity. 
 
The first example considered is thus the EU’s Global Approach to Migration.  
 
1. EU’s Global Approach to Migration 
 
i. How EU migration law intersects with the global 
 
Migration remains the last unsolved puzzle of globalisation, where the interests of 
incoming and outgoing movements of people have never managed to align. EU law is legal 
obliged to intersect with the ‘global’ as to migration in its treaties. Its codes, rules and 
standards regularly cite public international law and intersect therewith as part of its 
commitment to public international law in its treaties.47 In addition, international law 
provides for an extremely limited yet fundamental framework for migration as to asylum 
                                                 
47 E. Fahey, ‘Joining the Dots: External Norms, AFSJ Directives and the EU’s Role in Global Legal Order’ 
(2016) 41 European Law Review 105. See Article 21 TEU.  
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and immigration.48 The EU terms its own arrangements with a bloc third countries as 
bilateral arrangements and not multilateral as global, through their asserted consistency 
regionally and engagement with international norms. EU migration law is increasingly 
understood to communicate ambiguity as to its mixed objectives both internally and 
externally.49 The EU law and governance of migration has distinct internal and external 
facets which may be viewed as legally and constitutionally contradictory. There is legal 
competence for enhanced measures to combat illegal immigration but also to manage 
efficiently migration flows, but with fairness towards third country nationals.50 And the 
only external competence explicitly transferred to the EU under Title V TFEU is as to 
readmission and contrasts with the silence of the Treaties on other fields of migration 
covered by Article 79 TFEU, relying to some extent on implied external competences.51 
Moreover, EU external competences to promote legal migration and integration are 
concurrent competences with regard to Member State powers, which poses considerable 
issues also for coherence in practice. The AFSJ is also supposed to remain accessible to 
those whose circumstances lead them justifiably to seek access to EU territory.52Although 
there are difficulty balancing acts embodied therein, the EU has sought to strive to be a 
safe haven for those fleeing persecution.53 However, unrecognised refugees and asylum 
seekers have been assimilated into the generic category of Third Country Nationals, 
rendering their entry irregular or illegal unless they demonstrate compliance with general 
admission criteria. On the other hand, the EU border acquis contains general references 
to human rights and refugee law, giving the impression that special treatment must be 
accorded to those in search of international protection, in accordance with international 
and European standards.54 Although thus a highly imperfect matrix, EU law consistently 
                                                 
48 See J. Hathaway, ‘A Global Solution to a Global Refugee Crisis’ (2016) 1 Eur. Papers 193; J. Hathaway, 
‘Eighth Colloquium on Challenges in International Refugee Law’ (2018) 39(1) Mich. J. Int'l L. 1.  
49 See S. Lavenex, ‘”Failing Forward” Towards Which Europe? Organized Hypocrisy in the Common 
European Asylum System’ (2018) Journal of Common Market Studies, forthcoming. 
50 See D. Thym, ‘EU Migration Policy and its Constitutional Rationale’ (2013) 50 Common Market Law 
Review 709; J. Weiler, ‘Thou Shalt not Oppress a Stranger’ (1992) 3 European Journal of International Law 
65.  
51 See P.G. Andrade, ‘The Legal Feasibility of the EU's External Action on Legal Migration: The Internal and 
the External Intertwined’ (2013) 15(3) European Journal of Migration and law 263, 267-268.  
52 Tampere Milestones, 15-16 October 1999, para 3.  
53 See A European Agenda on Migration COM(2015) 240, p.1.  
54 See V. Moreno-Lax, Accessing Asylum in Europe :Extraterritorial Border Controls and Refugee Rights 
under EU Law (OUP 2017), 462.  
 seeks to engage with international norms and the global in its migration law-making 
because it is compelled to.55 Here, to set the global agenda is arguably impossible for the 
EU through its own laws.   
 
ii. Bilateral as global: the ‘global’ in the GAMM 
The EU’s approach to global migration is an important statement as to the ‘others’ of EU 
law. It has a powerful impact upon its neighbourhood whereby it undoubtedly shapes the 
legal order and institutional framework in its neighbourhood, e.g. the Eastern and 
Southern neighbourhoods.56 Its main concern as regards third countries is said to be its 
desire to protect its own internal security from outside threats.57 There are considerable 
unintended yet disruptive and even harmful implications on migration patterns between 
the EU’s periphery and the rest of the world. Thus, the diffusion of EU migration norms 
and policy can be said to have wide-ranging consequences on migration patterns beyond 
its periphery. The Global Approach to Migration (GAM) is, since 2005, the overarching 
policy framework of the EU external migration and asylum policy.58 It has a dual 
objective, both to balance a control oriented external dimension and the promotion of 
mobility and legal migration opportunities for third country nationals. It was first 
published in 2005 and constructed as a comprehensive strategy to holistically address 
human trafficking. Since 2005, the EU continues to describe it as the overarching 
framework of the EU external migration and asylum policy.59 Thus in 2011 its remit was 
expanded and updated as the Global Approach to Mobility and Migration (GAMM) to 
manage more irregular migration and human trafficking and manage migration and 
                                                 
55 See further Fahey above (n 47). 
56 See L. Delcour, ‘The EU: Shaping Migration Patterns in its Neighbourhood and Beyond’ in D. Kochenov 
and F. Amtenbrink (eds) The European Union’s Shaping of the International Legal Order (CUP 2013) 280; 
A. Betts, ‘The Global Governance of Migration and the Role of Trans-regionalism’ in R. Kunz, S. Lavenex, 
and M. Panizzon (eds) Multi-Layered Migration Governance: The Promise of Partnership (Routledge 
2011). 
57 See J. Huysmans, ‘The European Union and the Securitization of Migration’ (2000) 38 Journal of 
Common Market Studies 41. 
58 See Commission, ‘Communication from the Commission The Global Approach to Migration and Mobility’ 
COM (2011) 0743 final <https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/international-
affairs/global-approach-to-migration_en> accessed 11 November 2018. 
59 See Commission, ‘Report on the implementation of the Global Approach to Migration and Mobility’ COM 
(2014) 96 final < https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/e-
library/documents/policies/international-affairs/general/docs/gamm_report_1_2012_2013_en.pdf > 
accessed 11 November 2018.   
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asylum cooperation with third countries. Its update saw the launch of an allegedly newer 
and more consolidated second phase of the GAMM. One of the cornerstones of the new 
framework is the organization and facilitation of mobility and migration implemented 
through specific forms of bilateral frameworks with a very limited range of countries (i.e. 
Moldova, Cape Verde, Georgia, Armenia, Morocco, Azerbaijan). While the main reason 
for basing the Strategy on soft law (e.g. mobility partnerships) is flexibility, this flexibility 
is perceived to be one of its core weaknesses.60 As a result, it is not a strategy which 
receives copious amount of legal coverage in migration scholarship and frequently 
appears as a rather minor footnote in a complex web of legal sources across a range of 
leading databases.61  
 
The GAMM is criticised for its failure to adopt a rights-based approach for migrants, 
largely because of its basis in bilateral ‘mobility’ partnerships, misleadingly labelled given 
that have little to do with mobility.62 The GAMM has also come under considerable 
pressures during the EU’s migration crises, however, this does not appear to have 
constituted the foundational basis for contemporary EU action, evidence of its less than 
compelling vision of the global.63 As a result, the approach is a lot more about ‘push-back’ 
of people. This global approach to partnerships ironically does not promote mobility and 
instead is about country of origin readmission. The use of soft non-binding policy is seen 
as important there, flexible and broad enough to enable MS achieve political commitment 
on the negotiation of readmission to promote such an approach. 64   It has an 
                                                 
60 P.G. Andrade, ‘The Legal Feasibility of the EU's External Action on Legal Migration: The Internal and the 
External Intertwined’ (2013) 15(3) European Journal of Migration and Law 263, 277. 
61 See V. Chetail and C. Bauloz (eds) Research Handbook on International Law and Migration (Edward 
Elgar Publishing 2014); See B. Opeskin, R. Perruchoud and J. Redpath-Cross (eds), Foundations of 
International Migration Law (CUP 2012); See D. Thym, ‘’Citizens and ‘Foreigner’ in EU Law. Migration 
Law and its Cosmopolitan Outlook’ (2016) 22(3) Eur LJ 296. 
62 See E. Fahey, ‘Between Delegalisation and hyperlegalisation: on laws, norms and principles in the 
external management of migration’ In J. Santos Vara & S. Carrera (eds.), Constitutionalising the External 
Dimensions of EU Migration Policies in Times of Crisis: Legality, Rule of Law and Fundamental Rights 
Reconsidered’ (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar forthcoming). 
63 See J. Hampshire, ‘Speaking with One Voice? The European Union's Global Approach to Migration and 
Mobility and the Limits of International Migration Cooperation’ (2016) 42(4) Journal of Ethnic and 
Migration Studies 571.  
64 The GAMM places the ‘global’ dimension late within the policy, whereby (only) a UN framework is relied 
upon as the main expression of the ‘global’ question. In this regard, global processes are in name at least 
and literally at the back of the so-called Global policy framework. The GAMM also uses the term ‘global’ 
merely 5 times within a 25-page Global Strategy, perhaps less than one might expect substantively and 
 extraordinarily broad meaning and is highly misleading in its nomenclature because of 
its manipulative utilisation of territory and the direction of movement.  The use of the 
term ‘global’ is arguably thus misleading precisely because it is not really global but 
heavily bilateral and regional, but mainly bilateral:- and by that meaning a very limited 
partner-based range of structures with third countries in bilateral trade. Its global nature 
is somewhat of a misnomer where considerable gaps exist between EU law and a truly 
global approach e.g. as to the EU’s so-called Common European Asylum System 
(CEAS).65 There is little within the EU’s Global Approach here which is not heavily 
dependent upon cooperation with third countries and regional partnerships with 
considerable imbalances of power ensuing.  
 
 
ii. Transparency and openness as to the EU’s global approach in migration 
 
Significant transparency issues have occurred as to the EU global migration in recent 
times and show the challenges of understanding the EU’s global migration ambitions 
particularly for individuals, particularly as to clarity.  The EU-Turkey ‘Agreement’ of 2016 
is a powerful example, concerning the return of irregular migrants in Greece to Turkey, 
whereby for every Syrian returned to Turkey, another Syrian was to be resettled to the EU 
and thus stem the tide of global migration to the EU, particularly from Syria. It is one of 
the most notorious acts of EU external migration ever, learning ire and critique at national 
and international level. The General Court in its now infamous decision in NM v. 
European Council,66 held the EU-Turkey agreement to be a ‘non-EU agreement’ and 
instead to be a European agreement between EU Member States and Turkey, made at the 
margins of the European Council’s meeting in March 2016. The Court held that it lacked 
jurisdiction to review the ‘Statement’ on the basis that the statement was not an 
international agreement of the EU and that the EU institutions had not sought to conclude 
                                                 
aesthetically, the formulation of the ‘global’ dimension is thus minimalist i.e. the High-Level dialogue on 
International Migration and Mobility. 
65 See M. Dean, ‘Bridging the Gap: Humanitarian Protection and the Convergence of Laws in Europe’ (2014) 
20 Eur LJ 34.  
66 Case T-257/16 NM v European Council ECLI:EU:T:2017:130; Appeal Case before the Court of Justice: C-
208/17 P, pending. 
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the agreement. It thus shielded the EU’s Agreement from scrutiny and review in one of its 
most controversial decisions of all time. The Ombudsman had also previously been 
involved in the EU-Turkey Statement, where she recommended that the European 
Commission conduct a human rights impact assessment on this thorny instance of EU 
external migration, thereby bringing many facets of good administration, including, 
transparency and openness to the fore in the face of detailed arguments from the 
institutions seeking to shield the agreement from scrutiny as a ‘political act’.67 The 
decision of the General Court is currently under appeal and its consideration of the most 
elementary part of clarity as to transparency and migration seems ripe. Significant 
litigation is also ongoing as to the public interest in access to documents as to external 
migration, relating to the Statement.68 
 
Clarity as to borders and territory also goes to the heart of migration and not always in 
ways in which litigants can assert direct entitlements or easily seek readmission. In 
another recent seminal decision of the CJEU decided on the parameters of extra-
territoriality and longer-term visas, the Court is viewed as having shirked a significant 
question relating to aspects of transparency. In X and X v. Belgium,69 the CJEU in Grand 
Chamber considered a preliminary ruling on the interpretation of the Visa Code Article 
25(1)(a) of Regulation No. 810/2009 of the European Parliament and Council of 13 July 
2009, a highly ‘legalised’ area of secondary law.70 The applicants were Syrian nationals 
who had been refused visas in Aleppo at the Belgian Embassy for visas with a limited 
territorial validity. The question arose as to the obligations arising from the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights and EU law and whether they should have been issued visas on 
humanitarian grounds.  The CJEU held that the proceedings were not governed by EU 
law, specifically not its Charter in Articles 4 and 18 thereof.71 It is a controversial and 
indeed striking example of the ‘delegalisation’ of the global dimension to EU law here, 
                                                 
67  Decision of the European Ombudsman in the joint inquiry into complaints 506-509-674-784-
927-1381/2016/MHZ against the European Commission concerning a human rights impact 
assessment in the context of the EU-Turkey Agreement. 
68 ie T-851/16 Access Info Europe v. Commission ECLI:EU:T:2018:69. 
69 Case C-638/16 PPU X and X v. Etat Belge ECLI:EU:C:2017:173. 
70Regulation (EC) No 810/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 establishing 
a Community Code on Visas (Visa Code) OJ L 243, 15.9.2009, p. 1–58. 
71 Case C-638/16 above (n 69), para 45. 
 exorcising issues of clarity and openness.72 The growing extra-territoriality of EU law has 
entailed that many felt that the human rights dimensions of ‘others’ would be more 
explicitly enunciated.  It is a distinctive example apart from the EU-Turkey litigation on 
the practical manifestations of the global ‘others’.  
 
The GAMM is fundamental about migrant ‘pushback’ rather than mobility and exhibits a 
highly misleading use of the term ‘global’. It ultimately seems unlikely that any of the EU’s 
global approaches to migration will be adopted elsewhere and so it differs from other 
forms of global approach explored here next, e.g. as to ‘global PNR’.  Litigation as to the 
transparency of the infamous EU-Turkey statement is a particularly revealing example of 
the challenges of access as to the global in the domain of migration where its transparency 
and in particular its clarity are questionable, instigated by certain NGOs. Nonetheless, it 
is difficult for litigants to challenge EU migration law, e.g. to have the resources and 
capacity to assert transparency- particularly for those outside of the EU. Transparency 
and clarity issues demonstrate the weaknesses at the heart of EU global action. Their 
absence similarly indicates significant adverse consequences for individuals in a domain 
where the EU attempted to decisively deal with mass migration, replicated in previous 
and the following example also.  
 
The account next considers the EU’s explicitly ‘global’ approach to Passenger Name 
Records, as an express use of the term in AFSJ law and policy. It considers (i) how EU law 
intersects with global in its law as to the area of Passenger Name Records. It then (ii) 
examines why the EU terms a bilateral a global approach and then (iii) evaluates how EU 
PNR interacts with transparency and openness, particularly the clarity, publication, 
access dimensions thereof. 
 
 
2. Global approach to Passenger Name Records (PNR)  
i. How EU PNR law intersects with the global  
                                                 
72 See Fahey (n 62). 
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Commercial airlines carried more than four billion passengers on scheduled flights 
globally in 2017 and aviation law increasingly interlocks with international security and 
terrorism laws. Global aviation law is a complex regulatory field for the EU to assert its 
global significance.73 The transfer of airline passenger data is nowadays innately global 
and has become a murky matrix of global data security and surveillance law, affecting 
huge swathes of passengers on a daily basis. The EU now has a policy on the transfer of 
Passenger Name Records (PNR) data transfer which is expressly labelled as a ‘global 
approach’.74 It is arguably one of the most controversial policies of internal (a Directive) 
and external (EU-US Passenger Name Records Agreements (PNR)) EU law which began 
as US law and policy. PNR law has its origins in the post 9/11 US Aviation and 
Transportation Security Act of 2001 requiring all airlines flying into the US to supply PNR 
data to the US Customs and Border Control (CBP). This, however, was not compatible 
with EU law, given that Article 25 of the Data Protection Directive provided that personal 
information originating from within Member States may be transferred to a third country 
only if that country ‘ensures an adequate level of protection’.75 Thus, an EU-US passenger 
name records agreement was reached 2004.76 However, in 2006, the Court annulled both 
Decisions.77 A provisional seven-year Agreement with the US was then concluded in 2007 
to replace the earlier Agreement. The EP sought to postpone its approval vote thereof, in 
light of its new powers provided for in the Treaty of Lisbon pursuant to Article 218 TFEU, 
and pressed the Commission for a Global Strategy on external PNR with better redress 
                                                 
73 Air Transport Association of America v. Secretary of State for Energy and Climate Change, C-366/10 
EU:C:2011:864. 
74 See Commission, ‘Communication from the Commission on the Global Approach to Transfers of 
Passenger Name Record (PNR) Data to Third Countries’ COM (2010) 492 final. See E. Fahey, ‘Law and 
Governance as Checks and Balances in Transatlantic Security: Rights, Redress and Remedies in EU-US 
Passenger Name Records and the Terrorist Finance Tracking Program’ (2013) 32 Yearbook of European 
Law 1. 
75 Directive 95/46 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection of 
individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data [1995] OJ 
L 281, 31. 
76 On the Agreement and its predecessors: Agreement between the European Community and the United 
States of America on the processing and transfer of PNR data by Air Carriers to the United States 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Bureau of Customs and Border Protection [2004] OJ L 183/ 83 
and corrigendum at [2005] OJ L 255/168; Undertakings of US CBP issued on 11 May 2004 OJ [2004] L 
1235/11; Decision 2004/496/EC adopted on the basis of ex Article 95 EC in conjunction with ex Article 
300(2) EC. 
77 The CJEU held inter alia that ex Article 95 EC (now Article 114 TFEU), as the legal basis of the Council 
Decision read in conjunction with DPD, did not provide an adequate legal basis: See Joined Cases C-317/04 
and C-318/04, European Parliament v Council and Commission, [2006] ECR I-4721. 
 and effective legal safeguards. Thereafter, negotiation of a revised Agreement with the US 
followed suit and a ‘Second Generation’ PNR Agreement was agreed upon in 2011.78 It 
has been described by the European Commission as an ‘improved’ PNR agreement: 
enhancing data protection mechanisms therein; limiting the use of data; purporting to 
fight crime more effectively; placing obligations on the US to share data with the EU and 
setting out a detailed description for the circumstances for when PNR can be used.79 It 
has never been litigated and remains the overarching model for all EU PNR law with all 
third countries.80 In 2016, the EU developed its own internal EU PNR system via a 
Directive which stands as the internal intersection with the global.81 
 
ii. Bilateral as global: the EU’s global approach to PNR 
 
The EU signed Passenger Name Records (PNR) agreements with Canada82 and 
Australia83 in 2005 and 2006 respectively, on a case-by-case basis, which resulted in 
incoherent standards and rules for carriers. Accordingly, the European Commission 
proposed thereafter in 2010 that an EU law ‘global approach’ was more desirable as a 
rule-making solution.84 It argued that a multilateral approach e.g. a mandate to negotiate 
an international convention, would take too long, be too uncertain and would allow any 
country to join, resulting in lower data transfer standards than under EU law. As a result, 
                                                 
78 See Agreement between the United States of America and the European Union on the use and transfer of 
Passenger Name Record Data to the United States Department of Homeland Security 11.8.2012 [2012] OJ 
L 215/5. 
79 See ‘Press Release: New EU-US Agreements on PNR Improves Data Protection and Fights Crime and 
Terrorism’ IP/11/1368’ (European Commission, 17 November 2011) < http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_IP-11-1368_en.htm> accessed 11 November 2018. 
80 See further Fahey, above (n 74). 
81 Directive (EU) 2016/681 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the use of 
passenger name record (PNR) data for the prevention, detection, investigation and prosecution of terrorist 
offences and serious crime [2016]OJ L 119 132–149. 
82 In 2014, the EU and Canada signed a new agreement on the processing and transfer of Passenger Name 
Record (PNR) data by Air Carriers to the Canadian competent authorities to replace the existing agreement 
from 2006. Council doc. 10940/14 Brussels, 25 June 2014. 
83 See Agreement between the European Union and Australia on the processing and transfer of Passenger 
Name Record (PNR) data by air carriers to the Australian Customs and Border Protection Service 14.7.2012 
[2012] OJ L 186/4. 
84  See Commission (n 74).  
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a ‘global approach’ under EU law was preferable, allowing it to ‘upload’ its rules 
internationally,85 predicting that the number of such agreements was likely to increase in 
the foreseeable future and would result in the need for general standards, content and 
criteria for them, particularly as to data protection principles and safeguards. These 
principles formed the basis of the renegotiations of the PNR Agreements with the US, 
Australia and Canada, leading to the conclusion of new PNR Agreements with the US and 
Australia, subject to regular reviews and evaluation. The European Parliament voted to 
seek the opinion of CJEU as to whether the EU-Canada Agreement was compatible with 
EU law. The CJEU recently struck down the EU-Canada Agreement for its treatment of 
onwards transfer of data to third countries, which bodes ill for the EU’s new Directive in 
its field but also the idea of a ‘global’ approach which can pass muster.86 After the 
negotiation of PNR agreements with the US, Canada and Australia, an increasing number 
of third countries have sought the transfer of PNR data from the EU without similar 
agreements existing: Russia, Mexico, United Arab Emirates, South Korea, Brazil, Japan, 
Saudi Arabia and Argentina.87 
The EU’s use of the term ‘global’ here is quite a misnomer, which is in fact is arguably not 
global, but rather wholly bilateral. ‘Global’ as a term here is synonymous with an 
aggregated attitude or set of policies towards third countries and certain legal terms are 
repeated verbatim in Agreements (US, Canada and Australia). However, considerable 
differences exist between each PNR agreement. How the EU purports now to advocate a 
global approach to PNR is a noteworthy development on account of the manner by which 
the EU has acquired its norms from the US and absorbed them internally. One on level, 
it is highly explicit and transparent as an approach to the global. However, its origins are 
not so transparent or clear-cut, nor necessarily so ‘global’ either.  The labelling of the 
‘global’ approach here by the EU as a ‘strategy’ carries with it the intentional ambitions of 
the EU as a global actor. It is, however, distinctive from the global ambitions as expressed 
                                                 
85 New Zealand, South Korea, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Korea and Japan are also all using or testing PNR 
data but have not yet entered into agreements with the EU. 
86 Opinion 1/15 Draft Agreement between Canada and the European Union on the transfer and processing 
of Passenger Name Record data ECLI:EU:C:2017:592. Cf Article 29 Working Party, Letter to Commission 
on Opinion 1/15 (11 April 2018).  
87 See Council doc. 6857/15 (5 March 2015). 
 in, for example, internal market policies, in so far as it is an ‘inwards-out’ strategy rather 
than an ‘outwards-in’ one, i.e. which tries to co-opt others rather than to spread its rules 
more indirectly, almost by contagion yet has highly esoteric origins. Its recent internal 
deployment is similarly conflicted because these same origins. However, the global 
approach faces significant challenges from the EU judicial branch in recent times. 
According to recent CJEU caselaw, systemic and indiscriminate storage of personal data 
contradicts EU law and EU PNR increasingly falls foul thereof in each Agreement.88 As a 
result, global PNR is arguably a highly non-transparent policy, which has allowed third 
country norms to spill over into EU law and policy, with limited substantive change from 
their original guise.  Yet is also unlikely that the EU’s rules subsequently adopted will 
dominate globally or become model laws as originally intended and the template varies 
considerably still. Instead, a ‘global approach’ appears used when the EU’s actorness is 
particularly weak. Here, the EU’s global approach begun as a weak replicant or reactor 
of/ to US policy. It saw the EU act as a different form of global actor, attempting to develop 
a global policy in the face of one being inflicted upon it and others. 
 
iii. Transparency and openness as to the EU’s approach to PNR 
Similar to migration, the capacity of those affected to challenge and obtain resources to 
litigation the global transfer of data places it further away from scrutiny. The law and 
governance of PNR remains highly controversial and is a complex dimension of providing 
checks and balances on EU external security.89 There are several recent key decisions as 
to transparency and PNR concerning the Ombudsman and individual MEPs have mostly 
unsuccessful in directly seeking their data.90 MEPs increasingly raise concerns about the 
transparency of reviewing governance here.91 The Ombudsman is in particular 
                                                 
88 See Case C-293/12 and C-594/12 Digital Rights Ireland and Seitlinger and Others ECLI:EU:C:2014:238 
at 71. See also Case C-362/14 Schrems v Data Protection Commissioner ECLI:EU:C:2014:317; See Opinion 
1/15  ECLI:EU:C:2016:656, Opinion of AG Mengozzi. 
89 See further Fahey (n 74). 
90 See S. In’t veld MEP, ‘Transparency in the legislative process’, question to the European Commission on 
the PNR Directive:  P-007913-17 20 December 2017; E. Fahey, ‘Between One-Shotters and Repeat Hitters: 
A Retrospective on the Role of the European Parliament in the EU-US PNR Litigation’ in F. Nicola & B. 
Davies (eds), EU Law Stories (CUP 2017) (on in’ t Veld’s actions) Ch. 27. 
91 Ibid.  
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increasingly involved in transparency issues as to global PNR and its governance, which 
is instructive as to the forms of review being sought and conducted,92 despite her express 
exclusion from international relations in the Access to Documents Regulation.  
Fundamental rights, including aspects of transparency such as clarity and also openness, 
have featured prominently in the CJEU’s Opinion 1/15 on the EU-Canada PNR 
Agreement.93 It held that of the 19 PNR headings in the agreement, some were not 
sufficiently ‘clear and precise’. While retention was not problematic per se, the continued 
storage of PNR of all air passengers after their departure from a third country was not 
limited to what was strictly necessary. There, the CJEU has demonstrated the significance 
of good governance and public administration in international relations as to individual 
data transfers to third countries. Even in the absence of a plaintiff in abstract review, good 
administration and good governance appear as central principles. A lack of knowledge of 
the EU’s actions has also had adverse consequences for good governance and is instructive 
of the challenges of the global dimension here. Higher EU standards for the protection of 
data may complicate the jigsaw going forward, particularly as to enforcement, discussed 
further below. Still, the place of data transfer for security purposes in the absence of a 
global regime where de facto US dominance has set the global standard is important here. 
It is a good example of the complex generation of ‘global’ here, where the EU is a weaker 
actor and where the impact upon the individual is potentially highly significant. A lack of 
transparency particularly as to clarity and access masks the weaknesses underlying the 
EU’s approach. Nonetheless, transparency and particularly clarity and access, afford 
individuals important safeguards going forward as to the emerging global approach.   
 
                                                 
92 Decision in case 1959/2014/MDC on the European Commission’s refusal to grant public access to the 
award evaluation forms concerning applications for co-funding of mechanisms for the processing of 
passenger name records (2017); Recommendation in case 1959/2014/MDC on the European Commission’s 
refusal to grant public access to the award evaluation forms concerning applications for co-funding of 
mechanisms for the processing of passenger name records (2016); Decision in case 1569/2016/DR on the 
European Commission’s refusal to grant full access to an e-mail it received from an IT company during the 
preparation of the Passenger Name Record (PNR) Directive (2016);  Summary of the decision in case 
1959/2014/MDC on the European Commission’s refusal to grant public access to the award evaluation 
forms concerning applications for co-funding of mechanisms for the processing of passenger name records 
(2017); Follow-up to critical and further remarks - How the EU institutions responded to the Ombudsman’s 
recommendations in 2011 (2012). 
93 See Opinion 1/15  ECLI:EU:C:2016:656. 
 The account next examines a commonly understood situation where EU law has at the 
least a de facto global approach to it. It is thus a selection of inferenced-based accounts as 
to data protection and data transfers. It is thus non-explicit or not express and is not 
derived from the EU itself as an expression of law. This entails that these are examples of 
the EU’s approach to law-making which has global effects, de facto intent or global reach, 
as understand in practice in scholarship. It selects the EU’s approach to data protection. 
It considers (i) how EU law intersects with global. It critically assesses (ii) the EU’s extra-
territorial approach and (iii) it assesses the EU’s global approach with respect to 
transparency and openness.  
 
 
3.  Global approach to data in EU law  
 
i. How EU data transfer law intersects with the global 
There is little about the contemporary digital age that is not global irrespective of the 
specificities of the law. One specific legal regime that is broadly understood to have had 
global reach and effects is EU data protection law and the processing of data.94 Many even 
speak of the global reach, effects and the extra-territoriality and ‘Europeanisation’ of data 
protection law all as a monolithic idea, which has become all ears, eyes and arms.95 In the 
era of Big Data, the idea that individuals can effectively control their personal data may 
be viewed as simply naïve. Still, EU law has defied the odds and granted rights to those to 
whom it was thought fell beyond regulatory reach.96 The EU has essentially developed an 
approach to data protection because it is widely understood to have had extra-territorial 
reach and effects. This reach, both de facto and de jure, having evolved accidentally to 
                                                 
94 Since the Treaty of Lisbon, EU data protection law is comprised of a mix of primary and secondary law 
whereby Article 16 TFEU is the legal basis for EU data protection legislation while Article 8 of the Charter 
sets out a right to data protection [1995] OJ L 281.  
95 On the territorial scope of the General Data Protection Regulation: see C. Ryngaert ‘Symposium Issue on 
Extraterritoriality and EU Data Protection (2015) 5(4) International Data Privacy Law 221; C. Kuner, ‘Extra 
Territoriality and Regulation of International Data Transfers in EU Data Protection Law’ (2015) 5 
International Data Privacy Law 242. 
96 See for instance O. Lynskey, ‘Deconstructing Data Protection: The Added Value of a Right to Data 
Protection in the EU Legal Order’ (2014) 63(3) ICLQ 569.  
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being ‘by design’.97 In the case study of EU data protection, this ‘global’ dimension may 
be understood to comprise its norm evolution, both ‘inwards’ and ‘outwards’. The global 
here nudges a multitude of standards and enforcement paradigms but still faces the 
challenge of getting high standards in a world where the internet and data standards are 
segmenting along specific regional and national lines.98 
 
The EU’s Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC on the protection of individuals with regard 
to the processing of personal data and the free movement of such data was adopted in an 
age at which the digital relocation was merely nascent. Meanwhile, the digitisation of data 
has led to an exponential increase in the scale of personal data processing and the ease 
within which it can occur. Judicial scrutiny of its provisions in EU law has managed to 
generate a revolution with significant global effects. After the landmark decisions of the 
CJEU in Google v. Spain,99 Schrems,100  Digital Rights Ireland101 and Weltimmo,102  the 
place of EU law as a global standard-setter has evolved with much force as an idea, which 
in turn has also provoked many legitimacy and accountability questions.103 In particular, 
Google v. Spain generated a global debate on the parameters of the ‘right to be forgotten’ 
and whether it was a de facto or de jure ‘European’ or ‘global’ right enabling the EU to 
‘claim’ jurisdiction over processes occurring outside of the EU borders when the data 
controller had a relevant revenue-generating subsidiary in the EU. The Commission has 
thereafter unambiguously advocated the global reach of EU data protection standards for 
a variety of purposes.104  
 
 
                                                 
97 See further Kuner (n 95).  
98 E.g. China: see Mark Wu, The 'China, Inc.' Challenge to Global Trade Governance, (2016) 57 Harv. Int'l 
L.J. 261. 
99 See Case C-131/12 Google Spain SL, Google, Inc. v Agencia Española de Protección de Datos, Mario 
Costeja González ECLI:EU:C:2014:317 
100 See Case C-362/14 Maximillian Schrems v Data Protection Commissioner ECLI:EU:C:2015:650. 
101 See Case C-293/12 and C-594/12 Digital Rights Ireland and Others  ECLI:EU:C:2014:238. 
102 See Case C-230/14, ECLI:EU:C:2015:639.  
103 For example, see Bradford above (n 22); Shaffer, ‘Globalisation and Social Protection: The Impact of EU 
and International Rules in the Ratcheting up of US Data Privacy Standards’ (2000) Yale Journal of 
International Law 1. 
104 COM(2017) 7 Final communication from the commission to the European parliament and the Council 
Exchanging and Protecting Personal Data in a Globalised World. 
 
 The legislator has in turn responded and the subjects and objects of EU data protection 
law have been considerably reformulated.  The old Directive was replaced in 2018 by the 
EU’s new General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). Regulation EU 2016/69 on the 
protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and the free 
movement of such data is a significant attempt on the part of EU law to modernise its 
approach to data protection and to engage in regulatory coherence in the aftermath of 
landmark CJEU decisions. The GDPR has ignited a global wave of reflection upon global 
compliance with EU law. Indeed, several global companies chose initially to ‘turn the 
internet off’ to EU users as a result of the GDPR’s stringency.105 The new Regulation is 
also perceived to mark a significant extension of the extra-territorial application of EU 
law with respect to EU and non-EU established companies pursuant to Article 3 thereof 
and thereby refining the landmark developments begun by the CJEU in Google v. Spain. 
Article 3 of the proposed GDPR purports to apply to the processing of personal data in 
respect of activities of an establishment of a controller.106 It is understood by some to be 
sufficiently narrow in its scope, limited to tracking online activities of data subjects.107 It 
also seeks to provide for a ‘one-stop shop’ mechanism, whereby a data controller is stream 
lined in respect of the protection accorded.108 The effects of these developments upon 
global reach remains to be seen. It is also the subject of planned use and litigation by many 
citizens.109  
 
 
Beyond internal EU law instruments, international relations instruments increasingly 
regulate data on a significant global scale by intent and design. The EU-US Privacy Shield 
has also recently come into force in 2017, as a legal instrument which is intended to 
                                                 
105 The Guardian, ‘LA Times among US based news websites blocking EU users due to GDPR’ (May 25 2018) 
<https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2018/may/25/gdpr-us-based-news-websites-eu-internet-
users-la-times> accessed 11 November 2018.  
106 For example, recital 24 specifies what constitutes monitoring of behaviour. 
107 See generally C. Millard (ed), Cloud Competing Law (OUP 2013). 
108 National authorities had not been satisfied with the pre-existing regime precisely because it had resulted 
in ‘ad hoc transnational enforcement’. […] The GDPR is thus understood to have generated a process of 
‘Europeanisation’ whereby there is a significant shift from decentralised application of data protection law 
to centralised enforcement. 
109 E.g. ‘A third of Brits plan to exercise right to be forgotten’ (16 February 2018) 
<https://www.computerweekly.com/news/252435201/A-third-of-Brits-plan-to-exercise-right-to-be-
forgotten> accessed 11 November 2018.  
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replace the US Safe Harbour Agreement, the voluntary self-certification system with 
public enforcement by the US FTC, requiring US companies to treat data on EU citizens 
as if the data were physically in Europe. It specifically addresses concerns around data 
collection and privacy that arose in the case of Schrems.110 The European Parliament 
threatened to vote for suspension of the Privacy Shield unless considerable changes were 
made to comply with EU data protection rules in 2018, as to clarity on data control, 
remedies and oversight and it remains under much scrutiny and litigation, discussed 
below.111 The EU-US is not the only highly significant arrangement in place. In 2018, the 
EU and Japan agreed to recognise each other's data protection systems as 'equivalent', to 
allow data to flow safely between the EU and Japan. The EU maintains that its mutual 
adequacy arrangement will create the world's largest area of safe transfers of data based 
on a high level of protection for personal data and also complement the EU-Japan 
Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA).112 It is thus another significant global 
endeavour, ostensibly creating global reach.  
 
The instruments surveyed now constitute some of the broadest if not also increasingly 
important global legal instruments adopted, with enormous regulatory reach across the 
Atlantic and global territory, actually and metaphorically and show the scale of the EU’s 
intent. 
 
ii. Extraterritorial as Global: beyond the bilateral? 
Where data are everywhere and become disconnected from physical territory, 
extraterritoriality may seem the only viable regulatory option. However, extraterritorial 
application of EU data protection legislation may differ from extraterritorial application 
of other legislation in that it pertains to an individual's fundamental right. There are 
                                                 
110 Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2016/1250 of 12 July 2016 pursuant to Directive 95/46/EC of 
the European Parliament and of the Council on the adequacy of the protection provided by the EU-U.S. 
Privacy Shield (notified under document C(2016) 4176); Case C-362/14 (n 100). 
111 European Parliament resolution of 5 July 2018 on the adequacy of the protection afforded by the EU-US 
Privacy Shield. 
112 Communication from the Commission to the Council and Parliament, Exchanging and Protecting 
Personal Data in a Globalised World Brussels, 10.1.2017 COM(2017) 7 final; Commission launches the 
adoption of its adequacy decision on Japan, COM/2018/192 final. 
 important elements of putative extra-territoriality in the EU’s GDPR that have been 
negated through interpretative instruments but not necessarily in a very clear or 
transparent way.113 The EU’s extra-territoriality here initially accidental has instead 
evolved into intent to have global data traction.114 Arguably, what we witness then in the 
case of the EU regulation of ‘data processing’ is an overtly modest approach to the notion 
of the ‘global’ in contrast to the strident formulations of the CJEU. The evolution of the 
legislative process reflects a concern to temper the global reach of EU law here. 
 
For many, cyberspace is a separate and distinct world and is also an important example 
of reconstituted approaches to borders. It is rather neither real, nor separate from real 
space nor a continuation of it.115 However, the borders of cyberspace are embodied by and 
situated by individuals.116 While a jurisdictional border institutes the jurisdiction as an 
institution depending on an assemblage of language games that make sure we understand 
the consequences of crossing a border, this is all a lot less clearer when we cross the non-
territorial borders of cyberspace. Significant non-state governance mechanisms in the 
cyberworld have transformed the meaning of national territory and sovereignty in its 
capture.117 However, there is still no multilateral or uniform cyber law as an instrument 
of international law which is all encompassing.118 The US government has played a highly 
central role in maintaining the entity governing the internet, Internet Corporation for 
Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN), within its reach but has in recent years gradually 
relinquished its special position with them and the private sector has stepped in. The 
Snowdon revelations do not bolster the claims of the success of the Nation State in 
maintaining the rules and standards of the US as a privileged guardian of the internet 
through borders.119 There is increasing concern about the Clarifying Lawful Overseas Use 
                                                 
113 See D.J.B. Svantesson, ‘The Extraterritoriality of EU Data Privacy Law—Its Theoretical Justification and 
Its Practical Effect on US Businesses’ (2014) 50 Stanford Journal of International Law 53; C. Kuner, ‘Data 
Protection Law and International Jurisdiction on the Internet (Part 2)’ (2010) 18 International Journal of 
Law and Technology and Information Technology 227, 235. 
114 Lynskey, above (n 97). 
115 J. Cohen, ‘Cyberspace as/and space’ (2007) 107 Columbia Law Review 213. 
116 M. Hildebrandt, ‘The Virtuality of Territorial Borders’ (2017) 13(2) Utrecht Law Review 13. 
117 S. Sassen, ‘Embedded Borderings: Making new geographies of centrality: Territory, Politics, Governance’ 
2017. 
118 See T. Streinz, ‘Towards a Global Cyberlaw’ NYU Emile Fellows Form (February 2017) (on file). 
119 See The Guardian ‘NSA Snowden Files Decoded’ (1 November 2013) <https://www.theguardian.com/us-
news/the-nsa-files>  accessed 11 November 2018.  
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of Data Act (CLOUD Act), a US law that grants the US and foreign police access to 
personal data across borders, which conflicts sharply with EU data protection laws.120 
Nonetheless, to assert extra-territoriality in this new era appears fraught with challenges 
and ultimately the history of the EU regulatory process shows how the EU is not starting 
from a position of regulatory strength or dominance per se, perhaps more ‘first-mover’ 
advantage.  
 
 
iii. Transparency and openness in EU data transfers 
As an emerging field of EU law, cross-cutting the AFSJ, transparency and openness issues 
go to the heart of understanding the EU’s multifarious internal and external agenda here. 
Notably, transparency is not defined in the GDPR and not a principle therein.121 The 
concept of transparency there is understood interestingly to be ‘user-centric’ rather than 
‘legalistic,’ realised by practical requirements are outlined in Articles 12 to 14 of the 
GDPR.122 However, as Advocate General Cruz Villalon has stated pre-GDPR: “the 
requirement to inform the data subjects about the processing of their personal data, which 
guarantees transparency of all processing, is all the more important since it affects the 
exercise by the data subjects of their right of access to the data being processed …”123 One 
of the key recommendations made by the Article 29 Working Group on the future of the 
post-GDPR data landscape is as to transparency of communication with respect to third 
country data transfers.124 It has notably advised: ‘[w]here possible, a link to the 
mechanism used or information on where and how the relevant document may be 
accessed or obtained should also be provided. In accordance with the principle of fairness, 
                                                 
120 Clarifying Lawful Overseas Use of Data Act (CLOUD Act) (H.R. 4943). 
121 Cf Article 4 of Directive (EU) 2016/680: Recital 26 states that any processing of personal data must be 
‘lawful, fair and transparent.’ 
122 But where the quality, accessibility and comprehensibility of the information is important: 17/EN WP260 
Guidelines on transparency under Regulation 2016/679 p.6  
123 Case C-201/14 Bara ECLI:EU:C:2015:638  para 74. 
124 The relevant GDPR article permitting the transfer and the corresponding mechanism (e.g. adequacy 
decision under Article 45 / binding corporate rules under Article 47/ standard data protection clauses under 
Article 46.2/ derogations and safeguards under Article 49 etc.) should be specified. 17/EN WP260 
Guidelines on transparency under Regulation 2016/679. 
 the information should explicitly mention all third countries to which the data will be 
transferred’.125 
 
A range of recent caselaw has sought to challenge aspects of EU data law and data 
transfers and has seen individuals seek clarity on core aspects of EU’s new regime. For 
example, in Nowak, the CJEU has given judgement on the concept of personal data in 
proceedings relating to an accountancy examination, challenging a refusal to disclose an 
examination script. There, the Court held that the scope of ‘personal data’ under EU law 
is ‘very wide… and varied’.126 It thus affirmed the significantly regulatory capture of EU 
law but also indirectly mandating individual broader rights of review to individuals. It 
thus confirms the expanding subjects and objects of EU internal laws here but also the 
challenges of their knowability and clarity for individuals which is significant given that 
the EU’s data regulation was initially accidentally extra-territorial but now by design.  
 
Beyond internal legislation, the EU-US Privacy Shield contains a vast range of references 
to transparency, in its byzantine compilation of documents, letters and annexes but 
arguably being the antithesis thereof. For example, it outlines in a broad array of detail 
the significant of transparency to the workability and effectiveness of the provisions, in 
particular in Articles 2, 3 and 4, but involves nearly 50 references overall to 
transparency.127 Schrems I is currently before the Irish and EU Courts again in Schrems 
IV as to what the impact is of the EU-US Privacy Shield on the Schrems I decision in its 
public administration.128 There, a claim as to clarity and transparency of data transfer is 
taking place. It may be argued to be broadly litigating the transparency of data transfer 
and the openness of its processing. The CJEU is currently being asked to analyse the 
remedial regime of a third country to whom the data were transferred to assess 
                                                 
125 Ibid.  
126 C-434/16, Nowak, ECLI:EU:C:2017:994 para 49.  
127 E.g. 2.2(31) ‘To ensure the proper application of the EU-U.S. Privacy Shield, interested parties, such as 
data subjects, data exporters and the national Data Protection Authorities (DPAs), must be able to identify 
those organisations adhering to the Principles; 4: (138) ‘Adequacy of protection- In addition, the effective 
application of the Principles is guaranteed by the transparency obligations and the administration of the 
Privacy Shield by the Department of Commerce.’  
128 C-362/14 Maximillian Schrems v Data Protection Commissioner ECLI:EU:C:2015:650; C-498/16 
Schrems v. Facebook Ireland ECLI:EU:C:2018:37; Case C-311/18 Facebook Ireland and Schrems, pending; 
T-670/16 and T-738/16, La Quadrature du net, pending. 
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compliance with the Charter, namely the US and to consider the Privacy Shield and its 
legality, with the US Government being involved in the litigation.129 The battle of litigants 
such as Schrems, seeking to bring daylight to transatlantic data transfers in one of the 
largest hybrid governance cooperation globally on data, suggests that much remains to be 
understood as to the global dimension of EU law here by ordinary litigants.  
 
Finally, significant concerns surround the EU-Japan data flows recently negotiated, as 
regards its transparency and the opacity of the processes negotiated to protect rights.130  
The EU and Japan are currently involved in internal procedures on reciprocal adequacy 
findings at the time and writing. As regards EU global negotiations, it marked a c-change 
with previous negotiations e.g. TTIP, particularly as to the involvement of civil society. As 
a negotiation in progress it remains to be seen how significant these objections are.131 It 
is another powerful example of the intersection of internal practice and external action, 
where the subjects and objects are increasingly expansive and where the individual faces 
tremendous difficulties challenging as much. Here, clarity is more complex to evaluate 
given the evolving processes. Overall, what can be said is that while more transparency of 
the EU’s global agenda accords the EU some leverage, given the diversity of other global 
players seeking to oppose EU data norms or take hold of the internet in their regional 
domain (e.g. China) in particular, it also paradoxically shows the weakness of the EU as a 
global actor, beholden to many even in its broadest global regulatory endeavour.  
 
CONCLUSIONS 
This paper has explored how the EU’s vision of the global is the most transparent ever. 
However, the converse is not necessarily the case as to its legal content. Given that the 
EU’s internationalisation is consistent and aspirant in a shifting global legal order, it 
probably should suggest a distinctive character to the global dimension of EU law. The 
                                                 
129In Case C-311/18 the questions relate to an array of issues in 11 questions on the Privacy Shield on so-
called Standard Contractual Clauses and powers of a national authority to terminate data flows. 
130 E.g. M. Bartl and K. Irion, ‘The Japan EU Economic Partnership Agreement: Flows of Personal Data to 
the Land of the Rising Sun’ (2017) Amsterdam Centre for Information Law Institute Working Paper.  
131 See draft published ‘Commission implementing decision of XXX pursuant to Regulation (EU) 
2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council on the adequate protection of personal data by 
Japan’ (5 September 2018). 
 global dimension to EU law continues to broaden with increasingly expansive subjects 
and objectives, emanating from the rising incidence of the global in the daily business of 
EU law. However, as has been explored here, there is a significant mismatch of 
transparency practices in internal law-making concerning its global effects or approach 
on account of the crumbling exceptions surrounding international relations in EU 
transparency law, particularly the clarity, publication and access issues thereof. The range 
of EU institutions and actors adopting practices which appear increasingly misaligned 
with EU law have been considered here. The resulting incoherence in the internal and 
external uses of the term ‘global’ despite its rising banal incidence as regular business of 
the EU seems apparent.   
 
This account has shown that the AFSJ is a particularly significant area to consider ‘global’ 
law-making practices. Here, the EU is a weaker global actor than in trade per se and 
attempts to leverage global reach with perhaps more difficulty. The mismatch broadly 
identified in this account between internal transparency practices and external action is 
amplified here. In the AFSJ, the explicitness of the EU’s global approach does not 
necessarily entail transparency or even clarity. The AFSJ forms an emerging study where 
the subjects and objects of its global remit increasingly seek remedies. The remedies 
sought relate more and more to foundational elements of transparency, particularly 
clarity and access. The complexity of the global regimes addressed by the EU in this 
domain are self-evident. The capacity of individuals to challenge the clarity dimension of 
transparency therein will likely rise.   
 
As this account has demonstrated in 3 case studies, examining the intersection of the EU 
with the global, the ‘bilateral’ as global and transparency and openness issues, as to 
migration,  passenger name records and data, the approach to the ‘global’ in EU law is 
instructive. They form three dynamic areas of AFSJ law and policy where significant 
transparency and clarity questions are live and cause specific challenges to individuals at 
this intersection. These issues appear centrally linked to the mismatch between internal 
law-making and external action, at the heart of the EU’s global in the area of the AFSJ 
evident therein.  One on level, certain AFSJ policies such as PNR are highly explicit and 
transparent as an approach to the global. However, its origins are not so transparent or 
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clear-cut, nor necessarily so ‘global’ either.  The labelling of the ‘global’ approach here by 
the EU as a ‘strategy’ carries with it the intentional ambitions of the EU as a global actor. 
However, it can also mask non-transparent norm evolution. The ‘global’ dimension may 
do little to change how the EU’s actorness is particularly weak. The institutionalisation of 
EU data transfer is important in understanding territory and borders and will increasingly 
become the subject of litigation. It is a powerful example of the intersection of internal 
practice and external action, where the subjects and objects are increasingly expansive 
and where the individual faces tremendous difficulties challenging as much. 
 
In many instances seeking transparency remedies and redress through litigation is not 
straightforward as to ‘global’ policies. Nonetheless, transparency and particularly clarity 
and access, afford individuals important safeguards going forward as to the emerging 
‘global’ approach of the EU. They afford a useful vantage point to observe the mismatch 
between internal and external practices intersecting depicted here in the AFSJ.  
 
 
 
